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Abstract:
We investigate US households’ direct investment in stocks, bonds and liquid accounts and 
their foreign counterparts, in order to identify the different participation hurdles affecting asset 
investment domestically and overseas. To this end, we estimate a trivariate probit model with 
three further selection equations that allows correlations among unobservables of all possible 
asset choices. Our results point to the existence of a second hurdle that stock owners need 
to overcome in order to invest in foreign stocks. Among stockholders, we show that 
economic resources, willingness to assume greater financial risks, shopping around for the 
best investment opportunities all increase the probability to invest in foreign stocks. 
Furthermore, we find that households who seek financial advice from relatives, friends and 
work contacts are less likely to invest in foreign stocks. This result corroborates the 
conjecture by Hong et al. (2004) that social interactions should discourage investment in 
foreign stocks, given their limited popularity. On the other hand, we find little evidence for 
additional pecuniary or informational costs associated with investment in foreign bonds and 
liquid accounts. Finally, we show that ignoring correlations of unobservables across different 
asset choices can lead to very misleading results. 
JEL-Classifications: C35, D14, G11, G35
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1. Introduction 
The strong propensity of investors to concentrate their investments in domestic markets 
has been well documented (French and Poterba, 1991, Lewis, 1999)
1 and goes against the notion 
of diversification and the predictions of standard portfolio models like the International Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (Baele et al., 2007). In the case of stocks, the foregone benefits from 
international diversification can be substantial even after adjusting for exchange rate risk and 
border restrictions (Lewis, 1999).
2
When studying household portfolio choices it is important to distinguish the decision to 
invest in a foreign asset from the decision to invest in a domestic one, primarily because assets 
held domestically can be quite different in terms of participation costs, riskiness, informational, 
and management requirements from their foreign counterparts. As a result, households have to 
overcome different participation hurdles before investing in domestic and foreign markets. 
With respect to stocks, fixed entry costs have been proposed as a leading explanation of 
the limited stock market participation by households (Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991, Haliassos and 
Bertaut, 1995, Vissing-Jorgensen, 2003). Such costs include not only brokerage and monetary 
fees but also non-tangible costs such as costs of time, costs of processing information as well as 
costs of picking and monitoring advisors and keeping up with market developments.  
It is likely that some of the factors that reflect participation costs and that have been 
suggested as causes of limited participation in the stock market do not affect in the same way 
participation in foreign stock markets, for a number of reasons: i) ignorance about the existence 
of stocks can be quite common in the general population (see Guiso and Jappelli, 2005, for the 
case of Italy), while we would expect that stockowners are normally aware of the existence of 
foreign stocks; ii) directly held stocks are assets that are risky, information intensive, and 2
demanding with respect to their management, and are held by a select group of households. 
These households are very different in terms of resources, investment experience, education, risk 
aversion, and financial sophistication from the rest of the population (Guiso et al., 2002, 
Campbell, 2006, Alessie et al., 2007), and thus it is possible that their investment choices differ 
from those of the rest of the population; iii) foreign stocks can be affected by additional costs 
related to the monitoring of foreign companies, trading costs (Amadi and Bergin, 2006) as well 
as the lack of information regarding foreign policies, institutions and accounting practices 
(Ammer et al., 2006, Covrig et al., 2007, Dvorak, 2005); iv) having social interactions has been 
found to positively affect stock market participation (Hong et al., 2004), possibly because word 
of mouth information lowers informational costs. The same argument should imply a reverse 
effect for investments in foreign equity markets, given that only few households hold foreign 
stocks.
Home bias is not limited to stocks but extends to the case of bonds as well. Burger and 
Warnock (2006) document that US investors have very limited participation in foreign bond 
markets (especially those in emerging countries), while Fidora et al. (2007) extend this finding to 
several other industrialized economies, typically concluding that the bond home bias is even 
more pronounced than that for equities.   
In this paper, we investigate, using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), 
US households’ decision to directly invest in foreign stocks, bonds, and accounts. Our paper 
makes several methodological and empirical contributions. We document for the first time the 
existence of significant entry costs affecting household investment in foreign stocks, that are 
over and above any costs associated with entrance to the stock market in the first place. Evidence 
for these additional costs comes from the result that for the select group of investors who hold 3
stocks directly, characteristics that reflect the adequacy of resources and financial sophistication 
foster investments in foreign stocks. Such characteristics include large economic resources, 
willingness to assume extra risks, and use of the Internet to obtain financial information, and 
several empirical studies highlight their role in overcoming participation hurdles in the stock 
market (see e.g. the contributions in Guiso et al., 2002). Hence, the strong effects of these 
characteristics on foreign stock ownership, found in the pool of stockholders, point to the 
existence of separate participation hurdles for foreign stocks. This finding provides empirical 
support to the prediction of the model in Michaelides (2003) that small participation costs 
associated with foreign stocks are sufficient to generate complete portfolio specialization in 
domestic securities.  
Second, we study not only stocks, but bonds and liquid accounts as well, and find that, in 
contrast to stocks, most of the aforementioned characteristics are not associated with investments 
in foreign bonds and foreign liquid accounts. This result suggests that any additional costs 
affecting those two foreign assets are not large enough to discourage investing in them.  
Third, a key feature of our model is that it addresses the fact that investment in a foreign 
asset represents an option only for those who decide to invest in the asset irrespective of its 
provenance, i.e. it represents a two-stage decision process potentially affected by selectivity. In 
addition, our model permits the estimation of all possible pair-wise correlations among the 
unobservables of each investment decision, and we show that ignoring such correlations can lead 
to severely biased results.
3 The model fits the data quite well, given that its predictions of a 
variety of conditional and unconditional asset choices track closely the corresponding choices 
observed in the SCF sample. 4
Finally, we document that foreign asset owners are split mostly in two distinct groups, 
one owning only foreign stocks and the other foreign accounts, with the former being 
considerably more affluent, educated and financially sophisticated than the latter. 
While there have been numerous studies examining investments in foreign assets that use 
macro-level data or data on institutional investors, there have been only few that use household-
level survey data.
4 Bailey et al., (2008), using administrative data from a brokerage firm find that 
investing experience, higher wealth, and some behavioral biases can lead to international 
diversification in investors’ portfolios. For the purposes of studying investment choices, 
however, their sample is not representative of the US population because at least 70% of 
investors therein hold domestic stocks directly and at least 26% hold foreign stocks directly (as 
opposed to roughly 19% for any direct stockholding and 2% for direct foreign stockholding in 
the US population according to the SCF). Therefore, it is quite likely that choosing to open a 
brokerage account is correlated with the decision to directly invest in domestic and foreign 
stocks, which creates a selectivity problem, or even caused by this decision, in which case there 
is a simultaneity problem. In addition, the authors do not account for the two-stage decision 
process involved in foreign asset investment.  
Karlsson and Nordén (2007), study the foreign investments of a nationally representative 
sample of Swedish households through their pension accounts, and find that low job security, 
low economic resources, being male and less educated all lead to home-biased portfolios. They 
do not, however, model the aforementioned two-stage process involving foreign investment, and 
they do not distinguish between stocks, bonds and other more liquid investments.  Finally, 
Kyrychenko and Shum (2006) use the SCF to look at determinants of households’ decision to 
invest in foreign stocks and bonds. They model investments in foreign assets as a one step 5
process, by means of standard probit and tobit models, and find that financial sophistication and 
pessimistic expectations about the domestic economy induce ownership of foreign stocks and 
bonds (they don’t consider liquid accounts). However, by estimating the foreign stock and bond 
equations on the whole population, they treat the same way households that do not hold foreign 
assets but have invested in domestic ones and households that do not invest in those assets at all. 
The objective of our paper is clearly different. We focus on the participation hurdles that affect 
investments in foreign markets, over and above the hurdles hindering investment in the assets in 
any form. At the same time, we take into account the fact that households who invest in a given 
asset have a different configuration of characteristics and attitudes from their counterparts who 
have not invested in it. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides information on the data. 
Section 3 presents the model setup and discusses the estimation procedure. The empirical results 
and comparisons of the multivariate probit model with selection against simpler models are 
presented Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Data
In our analysis we use data from 1995, 1998, 2001, and 2004 waves of the SCF
5, which is 
the nationally representative survey that provides the most detailed disaggregated information on 
US households’ financial, real assets, and liabilities. A key feature of the SCF is that it is not 
subject to top coding of wealthy households, and that the rich, who own the largest share of 
wealth and are difficult to interview (and thus underrepresented in most surveys), are 
oversampled. As a result, the SCF is indeed representative of the US population (for more details 
on the SCF see Kennickell, 2000).6
Households are first asked in considerable detail whether they own any stocks, bonds and 
liquid accounts at all, and if they respond affirmatively they are then asked whether (part of) 
these investments are foreign.  
The question on foreign stocks refers to “stocks in a company headquartered outside the 
US”, which includes stocks that are cross-listed in US stock exchanges. Companies issuing such 
stocks must adhere to the same financial disclosure rules as domestic companies. Hence, the 
informational requirements of investing in stocks of cross listed companies should not be very 
different from those of domestic companies. Indeed Ammer et al. (2006) and Ahearne et al. 
(2004) find that cross-listing makes foreign firms considerably more attractive to domestic 
investors. Moreover, Errunza et al. (1999) show that domestically traded stocks of companies 
headquartered abroad represent a natural diversification option for spreading international risk. 
In our context, cross-listing implies that estimates of the influence that various factors have on 
households’ tendency to invest in foreign stock markets are likely to represent lower bounds on 
the effects that would have been found if the data had allowed us to focus only on foreign 
companies that are not cross-listed in the US. 
   Unfortunately, the SCF does not provide any information on whether households invest 
in foreign assets through their mutual funds or retirement accounts. As a result, it is not possible 
to get the full extent of the home bias in US household portfolios from our data. As we will 
discuss later, however, this feature of the SCF does not affect the consistency of our estimates. 
Furthermore, tabulations from the SCF data show that only 42% of US households that do not 
directly own foreign stocks invest in any stocks (domestic or foreign) through mutual funds or 
retirement plans. In addition, data from the New York Stock Exchange (2001, Table 21), suggest 
that roughly 55% of investors who have mutual funds or retirement plans invest in foreign stocks 7
through them. Therefore, we would expect less than 25% of the households that do not own 
foreign stocks directly to invest in them through other investment vehicles. 
In addition, Kyrychenko and Shum (2006) point out that, according to the Investment 
Company Institute (2004), foreign equities account for approximately 13% of all stock 
investment in IRA’s or 401(k)’s. As a result, foreign investment through such vehicles is 
unlikely  to explain the bias against holding foreign assets directly. One should also note that 
many households who have mutual funds or retirement accounts leave the investment decision 
making to the professionals who manage them. From that perspective, the study of investment 
choices that require active household involvement is more informative about households’ 
attitudes towards foreign assets.
6
Table 1 reports ownership rates of the three asset categories and their foreign 
counterparts. A non trivial fraction of households (roughly 10%) does not own any liquid 
accounts. Directly held stocks have become quite more popular since mid 1990s, while the 
intervening downswing seems to have slowed down but not completely reversed this trend. 
Bonds display a different pattern and seem to become less favored over the years. A similar 
fraction of households, which varies from 1.2 to 3.1 percent, depending on the year, owns 
foreign stocks and foreign accounts. Ownership of foreign stocks represents, however, an 
investment option that is chosen by a non trivial number of stockholders (almost 10 percent). On 
the other hand, only a tiny fraction of households reports ownership of foreign bonds. 
A household can invest in foreign assets in a number of different ways. In Table 2, we list 
all the possible combinations of direct foreign asset investment and their observed proportions 
among foreign asset holders in the data. We observe that the vast majority of foreign asset 
holders either invest only in foreign stocks (42.8%) or only in foreign accounts (51%), while 8
very few hold more than one kind of foreign asset. In Table 3, we compare the economic and 
demographic characteristics of the two groups of foreign investors with those of the whole 
sample. It is clear that those who invest only in foreign stocks have much larger economic 
resources, higher education, higher propensity to assume financial risks and higher financial 
sophistication (as implied by a longer investment horizon, a more extensive use of the Internet to 
obtain financial information, and a higher propensity to shop around for financial advice) 
compared to investors in only foreign accounts and to the whole population. Investors that own 
only foreign stocks are also older, healthier, more optimistic about the prospects of the US 
economy, more likely to be white, single males, self-employed, and to work currently or in the 
past in the financial sector. We also note that those who invest only in foreign accounts are also 
wealthier, healthier, more educated, more risk loving and more financially sophisticated than the 
average investor.
The striking dichotomy in foreign asset ownership and the substantial differences in the 
characteristics of the two principal groups of foreign investors suggest that there are distinct 
purposes behind investment in foreign stocks and in foreign accounts, possibly mainly 
speculative for the former while mostly transactions-related for the latter.  
3. The Model
3.1  Description and Variable Specification
The diversified pattern of foreign asset ownership shown in Section 2 suggests that there 
could be different participation thresholds associated with each type of foreign asset; therefore, a 
disaggregated empirical model is needed in order to study the foreign investment choices of US 
households. We construct such a model, and its underlying economic decision process is shown 9
in Fig. 1. First, households decide whether to hold any stocks, bonds and accounts, and all 
combinations of choices are feasible. If households decide to invest in a given saving vehicle, 
then they need to decide whether to invest in its foreign component (again, any combination of 
foreign asset holdings is possible). The structure of the model reflects investment patterns in the 
SCF, in which owners of foreign assets are typically a small subset of the owners of the assets in 
any form, who in turn own domestic assets with virtually no exception. 
The decision process shown in Fig. 1 could be studied through a lifecycle model with 
liquidity constrains and background income risk, as in Haliassos and Michaelides (2003) and 
Michaelides (2003), whose exposition we largely follow. We will discuss investment in stocks, 
but the model could be extended to the other two assets under examination (bonds and current 
accounts).
Let us consider a household that lives for T periods and maximizes an intertemporal life 
time utility U:
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Cash on hand is assumed to be a function of the fixed return on the risk-free asset R , of 
the random returns of domestic and foreign stocks (denoted by 
d R ~ and
f R ~
, respectively) and of 
labor income Y:10
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where E ~  denotes the exchange rate. Finally, it is assumed that households face no short 
sale constraints: 
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When allocating money across assets the household has to decide whether to pay an entry 
cost, which acts like a fee that will give access to the stock market. As a result, the household 
compares the expected lifetime utility resulting from paying the fee and gaining access to stocks 
against that of saving the fee and investing only in the riskless asset. If we denote the value 
functions associated with investing in stocks and in the riskless asset only by Vs and Vb,
respectively, then there is a threshold entry fee ks that will make the household indifferent 
between stock market participation and specialization in the riskless asset for a given range of 
cash on hand:   
) ( ) ( X V k X V B s s                                                                                                            (11) 
As has been shown by Haliassos and Michaelides (2003), relatively low fixed entry costs 
can justify non-participation in the stock market. Fixed entry costs can be tangible (fees required 
to open a brokerage account) or non-tangible and thus more difficult to quantify (time spent to 
get information about stocks and their properties, to select a financial advisor, etc.). Vissing–
Jorgensen (2002) has provided empirical support to the core prediction of Haliassos and 
Michaelides’ model, namely that small entry costs can explain limited stock market participation.  
Once the entry fee to the stock market has been paid, the household has the additional 
option to invest in foreign securities. In practice, only a minority of US households invests in 
foreign assets (less than 3% in the case of foreign stocks), while virtually all households with a 
foreign asset have also invested in its domestic counterpart. This strong observed pattern 11
provides the fundamental empirical justification for our modeling strategy: investing abroad is 
likely to be subject to additional informational and monetary costs, compared to investing in the 
asset in its domestic form. Therefore, when the household considers investing in foreign markets, 
it compares again value functions and acquires foreign securities if
) ( ) ( s s f s f k X V k k X V  !                                                                                             (12)
where Vf denotes the value function associated with investment in foreign assets and kf  the 
additional costs associated with them, while any costs of investing in domestic securities over 
and above the general entry cost ks are assumed to be zero. This feature of the model is again 
motivated by the empirical regularity that virtually all stocks owners own domestic stocks, and 
therefore it is unlikely that there is any significant additional cost affecting domestic stocks. 
As is shown by Michaelides (2003), even low entry costs associated with investing 
abroad, (e.g. brokerage fees need to opening a foreign account, time spent to collect information 
about foreign firms, to monitor investments abroad and to keep up with foreign market 
developments) can prevent ownership of foreign securities.  
Our study addresses empirically the issue of additional costs of foreign securities by 
showing that household attributes that help circumvent participation costs (e.g., economic 
resources, education, financial sophistication) are positively associated with foreign stock 
ownership even for those households that have overcome the entry cost for the asset in question. 
Such effects are consistent with the existence of additional entry costs particular to foreign 
securities, and thus provide empirical support to the prediction of Michaelides’ model. 
The above model with different participation thresholds in the domestic and foreign stock 
markets can be readily extended to the case of investments in bonds, given that investment in 
foreign bonds can also be subject to additional costs compared to investment in domestic ones. In 12
addition, while liquid accounts are virtually riskless and frictionless, almost 10% of households 
do not own such accounts. The existence of monetary costs such as mainly minimum balance 
requirements and service charges could be one possible explanation. As we will explain further 
below, our modeling strategy is flexible enough to allow for separate hurdles to be cleared in 
order to invest in the three assets in question and their foreign components. 
The decision process shown in Fig. 1 has the additional advantage of addressing the 
significant censoring observed in the data, namely the fact that ownership of a given foreign 
asset is observed only among those households who have decided to invest in the asset in any 
form. If the econometric model does not take into account the censoring issue, then one is likely 
to end up with severely biased estimates. For instance, a household chosen at random from the 
pool of stockholders is more likely to have invested in foreign stocks compared to a household 
with a similar configuration of characteristics that is drawn from the general population. This can 
be the case because households who have already invested in stocks are more likely to have 
acquired information and knowledge through stock management, which can foster investments in 
foreign equities. As a result, estimating the probability of foreign stockownership on the whole 
sample will produce different estimates from those that would have been obtained if the 
conditioning event of investing in any stocks is taken into account.
7 Consequently, one should 
study ownership of foreign assets only on the subsample of all owners of the particular asset in 
any form, while allowing for the possibility that these owners may form a selected sample, i.e., 
that the unobservables of the decisions to invest in the asset in any form and to invest in its 
foreign component are correlated. To put it differently, ignoring the censoring problem is akin to 
estimating an equation for union membership not on the subsample of workers but on the whole 13
population, which includes not only workers, but also the unemployed and those out of the labor 
force.
One could in principle consider using a multivariate second stage decision, i.e. after the 
decision to invest in the asset or not, one would have two separate decisions for investment in 
domestic and foreign securities. However, this modeling approach would be justified only if all 
four possible combinations of ownership of domestic and foreign securities were observed in the 
data. As we have pointed out before, however, virtually nobody holds foreign securities without 
also holding domestic securities. This fact also precludes the use of a nested logit approach, 
which has the additional disadvantage of not allowing correlations across the different nests (e.g. 
between stocks and bonds). Such correlations will prove to be crucial in our analysis, as will be 
discussed below.  
Our model could also be extended to include other investment choices, e.g. mutual funds 
and foreign mutual funds, which might have unobservables correlated with those affecting direct 
stockholding. While including other assets would be desirable, we are constrained by the fact 
that information on foreign investments in the SCF exists only for stocks, bonds and liquid 
accounts.
8 From a practical point of view, adding a seventh or more equations would make our 
model even more difficult to estimate. Yet, adding another asset choice would not affect the 
consistency of our estimates, given that omitting an equation in a multivariate probit model does 
not lead to inconsistent estimates. It is true, however, that an added equation could increase the 
efficiency of our estimates, if the unobservables of the added equation were correlated with those 
of the existing ones.
In the specification for each of the choices pictured in Fig. 1 we control for a rich array of 
household demographic and economic characteristics and we examine their differential influence 14
on investing in the same asset domestically and abroad, as well as across a range of asset types 
with varying level of risk. More specifically, we control for age, marital status, having children, 
health status, and race of the household head. Households with self reported health problems are 
discouraged from investing in stocks according to Rosen and Wu (2004), who have shown that 
this effect is not driven by some other factor which influences both health status and portfolio 
choices. Previous studies report strong race effects on the probability of owning risky financial 
assets in the US (see for instance, Bertaut and Starr-McCluer, 2002) and this may be mainly 
attributed to the less aggressive targeting of minorities by the financial sector. Significant race 
effects have been also identified to influence the probability of a household to own a bank 
account (see Rhine et al., 2006, who also examine alternative ways to carry out basic financial 
transactions).
We also control for the educational attainment of the household head. Household 
portfolio studies from various countries have documented a net positive contribution of 
education in investing in information-intensive financial assets, like stocks (see for instance the 
empirical contributions in Guiso et al., 2002). Education can affect portfolio choice mainly 
through three channels. First, less educated households are typically less aware of the properties 
of stocks, which tends to amplify any pecuniary costs associated with stock market participation. 
Second, education makes it easier to obtain and efficiently process information. Third, highly 
educated households typically face steeper future income profiles that are likely to influence 
their asset choices. In addition, there is empirical evidence that education strongly predicts 
ownership of a bank account (Caskey and Peterson, 1997). The effect may relate to the minimum 
financial knowledge that is required in picking and managing an account or it may reflect some 
broader effects like trust in the banking system. 15
Financial attitudes and practices can affect investment decisions in a way that goes well 
beyond the effect of life cycle fundamentals (see for instance the discussion in Bilias et al., 
2008). To that effect, we use a variable that records if the investor shops around a lot for the best 
terms when making major saving, investment and borrowing decisions. In addition, we 
distinguish households who work now or have worked in the past in the financial industry sector 
because they are likely to be familiar with financial products due to their work environment 
(Kyrychenko and Shum, 2006).
9 Furthermore, we examine the role of financial information 
collected through friends, relatives and work contacts as well as Internet use (Bogan, 2008).
10 As 
a measure of risk aversion, we use households’ willingness to take more than average financial 
risks. We also control for having a long investment horizon, namely in excess of ten years. 
To account for household economic resources, we use non investment income as well as 
net real and net financial wealth (thus allowing for distinct effects of accumulated assets that 
differ in terms of liquidity). It is crucial to control for resources since almost all theoretical 
models imply a key role of ‘cash on hand’ in determining portfolio choices. Furthermore, in our 
empirical specification we need to avoid confounding the role of other determinants with that of 
wealth, when the latter is not adequately accounted for.
11
We include a dummy for having received an inheritance because it can denote the 
existence of resources that were made available early in life. In addition, we examine how the 
intention to leave a bequest can affect investment choices that entail higher risks but also give 
households a greater potential to achieve a target wealth level that will be bequeathed to their 
descendants. We also take into consideration several household expectations about the future 
state of the US economy, domestic interest rates, and their own future real income in order to 16
assess such expectations’ influence on households’ asset decisions in general and on the decision 
to move funds into foreign assets in particular.
12
3.2  Econometric Specification 
We empirically implement the three-way foreign investment decision problem, shown in 
Fig. 1, by using a trivariate probit model with three additional selection equations.
13 The 
structure of our model is shown in Table 4. Using the notation of Jenkins et al. (2006) the three 
first stage equations (shown as equations (1), (3), and (5) in Table 4) model respectively the 
decisions to hold stocks directly, to hold bonds directly, and to have a liquid account. The three 
second-stage probit equations model the decision to hold foreign stocks given that one directly 
owns any stocks (equation (2) in Table 4), the decision to hold foreign bonds given that one 
directly owns any bonds (equation (4)), and finally the decision to have liquid accounts in 
foreign currency given that one has any liquid accounts (equation (6)). Hence, there are six 
probit equations in total, and we allow for unrestricted correlations between all six error terms of 
the underlying latent indices.  
The likelihood function distinguishes between eight different cases, which correspond to 
the eight possible outcomes of the three first-stage equations that denote holdings of any stocks, 
bonds, and liquid accounts (the likelihood function is discussed in detail in Appendix A). We 
estimate the model by maximum likelihood and pool the 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 SCF waves, 
which contain 17,565 households in total. Given that the SCF uses multiple imputation methods 
to impute missing values (see e.g. Kennickell, 2000), there are five different implicate datasets 
for each wave. As a result, we use multiple imputation estimation methods to take into account 
the additional uncertainty induced by the imputation, i.e., we first perform the estimation and 17
compute robust standard errors within each implicate, and then combine the estimates and 
standard errors across implicates using the rules described in Rubin (1987). Given that multiple 
integrals (ranging from three to six dimensions) appear in the likelihood terms, we evaluate them 
by simulated maximum likelihood using the GHK simulator (Geweke, 1999, Keane, 1994).
14
Our multivariate probit model with censoring consists in practice of eight multivariate 
probit specifications estimated in eight different subsamples, as can be readily seen from the 
likelihood function discussed in Appendix A; therefore, it does not require any additional 
identification assumptions to those underlying a standard multivariate probit model. Moreover, 
identification in our model is further assisted by the fact that different equations are estimated in 
different subsamples, whereas in a standard multivariate probit all equations appear in all 
possible subsamples (see Schmidt, 1981, and Gao et al., 2001, on the usefulness of sample 
separation information).
15
All the above imply that our full maximum likelihood estimation procedure does not 
require any exclusion restrictions for identification, as is also the case with the standard 
multivariate probit model (see also Greene, 2007). We have, however, added a variable denoting 
a precautionary saving motive
16 as an exclusion restriction, and, as a robustness check, we have 
also estimated our model without it, and results were essentially identical. This finding is 
consistent with the fact that the structure of the model is sufficient for identification. In what 
follows we present the results from the model that includes the precautionary saving motive 
variable. 
When discussing our results, we need to be aware of the fact that regression coefficients 
in discrete choice models are very difficult to interpret economically because they show the 
effect of a given regressor on a latent index which has limited economic significance 18
(coefficients are shown in Table A.1 in the Appendix). Making sense of these coefficients 
becomes even more difficult in the context of a multi-equation discrete choice model with 
correlated disturbances. This is so because a coefficient in a given equation does not reflect the 
influence that its associated regressor can have through its presence in the equations for the other 
choices. This influence could be transmitted to the equation of interest through the cross-
correlated equation disturbances.
17 Hence, we will concentrate our discussion of the estimation 
results on the following economically meaningful magnitudes, derived out of the full multi-
equation model: i) the probabilities of different asset choices of interest generated by the model; 
ii) the marginal effects of the regressors on the probabilities of those asset choices. Throughout 
our discussion we will be comparing the aforementioned magnitudes as derived from the 
multivariate probit with selectivity with those derived from estimating three separate probit 
models with selectivity for stocks (equations (1) and (2) in Table 4), bonds (equations (3) and 
(4)), and liquid accounts (equations (5) and (6)).
18
It is also worthwhile to examine the estimated correlations of the disturbances across 
equations (shown in Table 5) because they could substantially affect probabilities of asset 
choices. We observe that the selectivity term for stocks, ȡȣu, is equal to 0.73 and strongly 
significant, while the corresponding one for bonds, ȡvn, is equal to 0.17 and also very significant. 
On the other hand, there is no evidence of selectivity for liquid accounts.
19 These results suggest 
that stock and bond owners form a selected sample and thus estimating probits of foreign stock 
(bond) ownership among stockholders (bondholders) without accounting for selectivity leads to 
inconsistent estimates. As for the correlations across the three saving vehicles (stocks, bonds, 
accounts) we find that the unobservables in the equation for any stockholding are correlated with 
the unobservables in the equations for bonds, foreign bonds, liquid accounts, and foreign liquid 19
accounts, possibly because of some common investment characteristics and preferences like 
interest in foreign investment, common monitoring costs and appreciation of the benefits of 
diversification (Alessie et al., 2004). On the other hand, unobservables in the foreign stock 
equation are not correlated with those in the foreign bonds and foreign accounts equations, which 
is consistent with the sharp dichotomy in foreign asset holdings observed in Table 2. 
Unobservables in the foreign bonds equation, however, are correlated with those in the foreign 
liquid accounts equation, potentially because both decisions involve less risk than that for foreign 
stocks.
We then proceed to check the joint statistical significance of the correlation coefficients. 
Since our estimation procedure takes into account multiple imputation, we use the F-test 
suggested by Li et al. (1991) to account for the additional uncertainty induced by multiple 
imputation. We first perform the test by including all correlation coefficients except three, 
namely the correlations ȡȣu, ȡvn and ȡİe of the errors that respectively correspond to the first and 
second stage equations for stocks, bonds and liquid accounts and their foreign counterparts and 
represent selectivity within each of those three saving vehicles. Hence, if the null hypothesis 
were not rejected, then one could model foreign asset investment in each of the three saving 
vehicles independently of what happens with the other two by estimating the aforementioned 
three simpler separate two-stage probits with selection. However, the value of the F-statistic is 
equal to 30.83 (p-value: 0.00), and thus the null hypothesis is strongly rejected. When we add the 
three correlation terms denoting selectivity (i.e., ȡȣu, ȡvn and ȡİe) to the joint test of correlations, 
the F-statistic is equal to 34.22 (p-value: 0.00), again strongly rejecting the null. Hence, in our 
context and in contrast to what happens in Jenkins et al. (2006), we conclude that one cannot 20
ignore the correlations of the unobserved factors across equations when estimating the 
probabilities of asset choices of interest. 
The multivariate nature of the model permits the computation of a wide range of asset 
choice probabilities as follows: any asset combination is reflected by a particular 6-tuple of 
values of the six-element vector (S, FS, B, FB, A, FA) and has a probability given by 
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where ș ˆ Y m , į ˆ H m , ȕ ˆ D m FA FB FS  do not appear in Np when S=0, B=0, A=0, respectively. The same 
is true for all terms in ȡinvolving mFS, mFB, and mFA. Given that asset combinations are 
mutually exclusive, a set of asset combinations has a probability equal to the sum of the 
probabilities of the individual combinations. Therefore, the probability of any asset choice is 
equal to the sum of the probabilities of all asset combinations in which this choice is observed. 
As an example, the conditional probability of holding foreign stocks given ownership of stocks 
in any form can be expressed as the sum of the probabilities of all asset combinations that 
include investment in foreign stocks, divided by the corresponding sum of probabilities for 
investment in any stocks, that is, 21
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The reduction in the dimensionality of the normal integrals implied by the last equality in 
(14) does not extend in general to more complicated choices of interest, e.g. to the probability of 
owning foreign stocks conditional on owning any foreign asset,  which is equal to 
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where AFI denotes investment in any foreign asset, and the summation in the denominator is 
over all asset combinations in which at least one foreign asset is held.
20
Marginal effects are computed as the change in the probabilities when there is an 
appropriately defined change in the value of the regressor.
21 We estimate probabilities and 
marginal effects and their standard errors via Monte Carlo simulation (see Appendix B for 
details).22
4. Empirical Results 
In this section we present predictions of various asset choices of interest, and marginal 
effects (or semi-elasticities) for each of the three assets and their foreign counterparts. In 
particular, Table 6 compares actual and predicted population proportions of households who 
make various asset choices, while Table 7 presents marginal effects on the probability of owning 
stocks and conditional marginal effects on the probability of owning foreign stocks, (conditional 
on owning any stocks), from both the two stage probit with selection (columns 1-4) and the 
multivariate probit with selection (columns 5-8). Similar results for bonds and accounts are 
summarized by Tables 8 and 9, respectively. By focusing on conditional probabilities of second-
stage foreign asset choices we can disentangle the effects of household characteristics on these 
choices while controlling for their corresponding effects on first-stage decisions. Therefore, we 
can investigate whether there are any additional participation thresholds faced by prospective 
investors in the foreign component of a given asset, even after investors have overcome any 
informational or pecuniary obstacles of investing in the asset in any form.   
 4.1   Prediction of Asset Choices 
A useful check of the fit of our model would be to compare its predictions with the 
outcomes observed in the data. To this effect, in column 1 of Table 6 we report the observed 
population proportions of households making various asset choices and we compare them with 
the predictions from the simple two-stage probits with selection, shown in column 2, and with 
those from the multivariate probit with selection, shown in column 4 (details on the calculation 
of predicted proportions are provided in Appendix C).  23
We observe that the multivariate model with selection does in general a good job of 
predicting sample proportions, even for asset choices with small actual prevalence.
22 In addition, 
it gives significantly better predictions than the simple independent two-stage probits for the 
probabilities of holding foreign stocks conditional on holding any stock, and the corresponding 
conditional probability for bonds. The superiority in the predictions of the multivariate probit 
model is even more apparent for probabilities involving choices across the three different saving 
vehicles (e.g. the probabilities of holding any stocks conditional on owning any bonds, of 
owning foreign stocks given ownership of foreign accounts, of owning any foreign asset, etc.). 
The reason for the generally very poor predictive performance of the independent two-stage 
probits in those cases (with the exception of the probability of holding foreign bonds conditional 
on holding foreign stocks and the probability of having liquid accounts conditional on having 
any foreign asset, for which the two models give similar predictions) is precisely the failure to 
take into account the correlations in the unobservables across the different saving vehicles.
23
4.2    Stocks and Foreign Stocks 
Marginal effects from the first stage regression of the multivariate probit specification on 
stock ownership are shown in Table 7, column 5. Our results are in line with existing findings in 
the empirical household portfolio literature for the US (e.g. Bertaut and Starr-McLuer, 2001). 
Household characteristics like larger resources, higher education attainment, willingness to 
assume additional risks, and being white, strongly increase the probability of owning stocks. For 
instance, having a college degree increases by 18 percentage points (pp) the probability of 
owning stocks directly, after controlling for resources and several indicators of financial attitudes 
and practices. Expectations about increases in future real income have a positive effect on direct 24
stock holding, which is consistent with the predictions of intertemporal household portfolio 
models with background income risk and borrowing constraints (Cocco et al., 2005, Haliassos 
and Michaelides, 2003). More specifically, these models predict a positive investment in the 
risky asset for households that anticipate steeper future income profiles.
24 The existing empirical 
literature (see for example the contributions in Guiso et al., 2002) has attributed part of the 
estimated influence of education to this effect, since the more educated face upward-sloping 
income profiles; nevertheless, our results suggest that income and education have separate and 
significant effects. It is also worth mentioning that households that have members working in the 
financial sector now or in the past are also more likely to invest in stocks. This result is 
consistent with the view that directly held stocks represent a saving vehicle which is favored by 
investors familiar with the properties and the management of information-intensive investments. 
Using the Internet to collect financial information is also positively associated with investment in 
stocks, possibly because of the informational advantages and the lower monitoring costs that 
Internet use can bring about. All in all, results in the first stage indicate that directly held stocks 
are owned by a select group of investors characterized by large economic resources, low risk 
aversion and financial attitudes and practices that favor information-intensive investments.  
Moving to the results from the second stage (Table 7, column 7) we find that, within this 
select group of stockowners, those with higher financial and real wealth, and with a sizeable 
inheritance received are significantly more likely to invest in foreign stocks. Furthermore, 
households willing to assume a higher than average financial risk have a higher probability of 
holding foreign stocks (4 pp) compared to their more risk-averse counterparts. Stockowners who 
extensively shop around for the very best terms before investing are more likely to own foreign 
stocks (2.5 pp); the same holds for investors who have a long investment horizon (2.1 pp), are 25
sophisticated enough to use Internet to get financial information (2.6 pp), and have a college 
degree (4.7 pp, significant at 10%). On the other hand, variables denoting various expectations 
were not found significant. While race effects were positive and significant in the first stage, they 
are no longer significant and have the opposite sign in the second. This result suggests that, 
ceteris paribus, foreign stocks are equally popular among non-white stock owners.
25
The negative effect of the variable that denotes obtaining financial information by asking 
other people, and the fact that it does not matter for the first-stage decision are quite notable, 
since they prima facie contradict the findings of Hong et al. (2004), who document a positive 
association between social interactions and stockholding (direct and through mutual funds). 
However, as they also point out this effect could work either way, because if the asset is widely 
held then prospective investors are likely to find in their social circle people who own it and can 
provide information about it (thus making it easier for investors to own it). On the other hand, 
the opposite should happen with assets that are only owned by few, which is the case with 
directly held stocks and especially foreign stocks. Hence, the conjecture by Hong et al. (2004) is 
indeed corroborated by our results. 
Our results imply that some of the factors that could help households clear the 
unobserved threshold of participation in the stock market, and that appear significant in the first 
stage, have also an economically and statistically significant role in the decision to invest in 
foreign stocks. Given that these factors do not exhaust their influence in the first stage, they point 
to the existence of additional thresholds that stockholders have to overcome in order to invest in 
foreign stocks. Such thresholds may reflect information requirements about foreign accounting 
and tax practices, corporate relationships, rate of return calculations, and the legal system, as 
well as monetary costs of participation in foreign markets. In addition, there are non-tangible 26
costs (e.g. time required to process information and trade assets in foreign markets), which are 
likely to be higher in foreign markets. Hence, it appears that households who own stocks directly 
do not view foreign stocks as a simple investment option that can increase their portfolio 
diversification and provide hedging against domestic market uncertainty. Rather, households 
perceive foreign stocks as a specialized investment that involves higher risks (related to both 
markets and exchange rate), and requires additional resources, good knowledge of foreign 
financial markets, and well-informed investment decision making. These requirements may be 
even stronger than what our estimates imply, given that we have to include in our investigation 
foreign stocks that are cross-listed in US stock exchanges, and thus should exhibit lower 
information and pecuniary costs than stocks that are not cross-listed. 
Marginal effects from the simple two-stage probit model for stocks are shown in columns 
1-4 of Table 7. While the first stage effects differ very little from those of the multivariate model, 
those in the second stage, referring to the conditional probability of owning foreign stocks given 
ownership of any stocks, are very different. No variable exhibits any statistically significant 
effect in the simpler model, and thus one gets a very misleading picture of the effect of 
household characteristics on foreign stockholding that implies that there are no additional 
obstacles for investors to overcome when considering this choice.  
4.3 Bonds and Foreign Bonds 
Table 8 summarizes the results for bonds. There are no notable differences in the results 
from the multivariate and the two-stage probit, with the only exception being the time dummies 
and the dummy for self-employed in the second stage which turn to be significant under the 
multivariate model. 27
First stage results on bond ownership from the multivariate model (column 5) suggest 
that they are more likely to be held by the wealthier, the better educated, the whites, the married 
and those with long investment horizon. In contrast to stocks, indicators of financial attitudes and 
practices (extensively shop around for the best investment options and willingness to assume 
high risks) do not matter. Willingness to undertake risk is not significant either, which is 
expected given that bonds are generally considered safer than stocks. However, bond ownership 
is encouraged by social interactions. An expected decrease in real income augments the 
probability to own bonds, possibly because they reduce overall portfolio risk in unfavourable 
circumstances. 
On the other hand, the effects on the conditional probability of foreign bond ownership 
are small and insignificant (except for time effects), suggesting that once the threshold of any 
bond ownership is overcome, there are small or no additional costs of investment in foreign 
bonds.
26
4.4  Liquid Accounts and Accounts in Foreign Currency 
Turning to the liquid accounts (Table 9), we observe that the multivariate probit and the 
simpler two-stage probit produce similar results not only for the first stage, but also for the 
second one. Results from the first stage suggest that households with low resources, as well as 
those with non-white, low educated, retired and unemployed heads are less likely to own a liquid 
account. This same is true for single males, those in poor health as well as households with 
problems in obtaining credit. These findings are consistent with empirical studies that investigate 
the characteristics of households who do not have any liquid accounts (see for instance Rhine et 
al., 2001). Some of the factors that have been suggested as explanations for no ownership of 28
bank accounts include households’ lack of resources, inability to manage an account, preference 
not to deal with banks and to maintain privacy in financial matters, poor credit histories as well 
as the existence of monetary costs and fees, mainly minimum balance requirements and service 
charges (see Aizcorbe et al., 2003, and Hogarth et al., 2004). 
We also find that investors who save for precautionary reasons are more likely to have a 
liquid account. The same holds for those who use the Internet to obtain financial information, 
possibly because this way they can monitor and manage their savings more easily. Those who 
expect the US economy to do worse are less likely to have a bank account (possibly because they 
fear the repercussions of a downturn on the financial system), while those who expect a lower 
real income in the future are more likely to have a bank account, maybe as part of a defensive 
investment strategy. On the other hand, financial practices, like systematic shopping for the best 
investment options and long investment horizon, are small in magnitude or insignificant. 
Marginal effects on the probability of owning accounts in foreign currency conditional on 
ownership of any liquid account are displayed in column 7 of Table 9. We notice that, and in 
contrast to foreign stocks, almost none of the factors that might help overcome informational or 
pecuniary costs (education, length of investment horizon, using the Internet, shopping around for 
the best terms before investing, discussing financial choices with others, non-investment income, 
financial and real wealth) matter for having a foreign account, the only exception being working 
now or in the past in the financial sector (0.5 pp, significant at 10%). In addition, the effect of the 
willingness to assume higher risk is significant in the second stage (0.6 pp), possibly reflecting 
the exchange rate risk that account holders need to assume in order to invest in foreign currency. 
This effect is, however, quantitatively much smaller than the corresponding one derived for 
foreign stocks, which involve additional uncertainties related to the performance of the stock 29
market. Finally, those who expect an increase in domestic interest rates are less likely to invest 
money into foreign accounts (-0.6 pp), which makes economic sense given that higher domestic 
interest rates make liquid accounts in the US relatively more attractive.  
4.5   Foreign Asset Location among Owners of Foreign Assets 
One of the advantages of our multivariate probit model is that it allows the calculation of 
probabilities of composite events, in contrast to simpler models like the two-stage probits. As we 
have already discussed, households who own foreign assets are essentially split between those 
who own only foreign stocks and those who have only foreign accounts, while only very few 
make a foreign investment in more than one saving vehicle (see Table 2). Therefore, it would be 
worthwhile to examine the factors that influence households’ decision to choose each of the three 
foreign assets conditional on any foreign asset ownership. In other words, we investigate how 
households that have decided to invest abroad in any form locate their investments across the 
three assets that have different market risk. This exercise allows us to examine from a different 
angle participation thresholds in the three foreign assets. 
Conditional marginal effects for each of the three assets are displayed in Table 10.
27 As 
expected, given the dichotomy in the asset location choices among foreign asset owners, there 
are opposite effects of many covariates on the conditional probabilities of investing in foreign 
stocks and foreign accounts. A college education, higher economic resources, willingness to take 
high financial risks, shopping around before investing, and a longer investment horizon, all 
strongly contribute to locating foreign investment in stocks. On the other hand, all these factors 
make households less likely to locate their foreign investments in liquid accounts. In addition, 
the role of expectations about domestic interest rates appears consistent with economic theory: 30
an expected increase in the US interest rates encourages investments in foreign stocks (4.6 pp), 
while it discourages investments in foreign accounts (-4.5 pp). As for foreign bonds, the only 
factors that matter are willingness to assume financial risk (negatively, probably because bonds 
are less risky than stocks) and time dummies (positively). 
All in all, results from this section suggest that among foreign asset holders, the wealthier 
and more financially sophisticated choose primarily to invest in stocks, while the less affluent 
and less educated tend to prefer foreign accounts. To the extent that the immigrant population is 
overrepresented in the latter group, their preference for liquid accounts could be explained by 
their need to transfer money back to their home countries.  
5.   Conclusions 
The limited investment in foreign assets by US households is notable because it can 
imply large foregone gains from international diversification. We study this phenomenon in a 
way that distinguishes between investments in general and those in foreign markets in particular, 
and we apply this approach to stocks, bonds, and liquid accounts held directly. To that effect, we 
construct a flexible multivariate probit model that allows households to clear different 
participation hurdles in order to invest domestically and abroad, while taking into account the 
fact that those who have invested in the asset in the first place possess a different configuration 
of characteristics from the general population, i.e., they form a selected sample. In addition, we 
allow for the interdependence of all decisions through the correlations of their unobservables, 
and show how one can calculate economically meaningful magnitudes (probabilities and 
marginal effects) out of this multi-equation discrete choice model while taking into account the 
full spectrum of the correlations between unobservables. 31
A novel result of our analysis is that households face obstacles in investing in foreign 
stocks directly that are separate from those affecting investment in domestic stocks and require 
economic resources and financial sophistication to be overcome. This finding provides empirical 
support to the prediction of the model in Michaelides (2003) that small entry costs associated 
with investments abroad can generate specialization in domestic securities. We find no such 
evidence for foreign bonds while for liquid accounts there is some evidence for the presence of 
participation thresholds, which are, however, much weaker than those for foreign stocks. 
Furthermore, our results suggest that households who seek financial advice from 
relatives, friends and work contacts are significantly less likely to invest in foreign stocks. This 
result corroborates the conjecture by Hong et al. (2004) that social interactions should discourage 
investment in foreign stocks, given their limited popularity. In addition, conditional on owning 
any foreign asset, we find that economic resources and characteristics that suggest financial 
sophistication are positively associated with ownership of foreign stocks and negatively with 
ownership of foreign accounts. This finding is due to the fact that foreign investment is 
undertaken primarily by two population groups: the first one is wealthier, more educated and 
better informed about financial issues and invests only in foreign stocks while the second one has 
opposite characteristics and invests only in foreign liquid accounts. 
We also show that accounting for interrelationships among different investment decisions 
through a multivariate probit model with selection is important because: i) both foreign stock 
owners and bond owners are selected samples and thus not representative of the general 
population; ii) ignoring correlations of unobservables across the three saving vehicles leads to 
very misleading results about the effects of characteristics on foreign stock ownership and often 
to inferior predictions of population asset choices, and is also strongly rejected statistically. 32
Finally, our results point to the importance of household financial literacy (Lusardi and 
Mitchell, 2007, Alessie et al., 2007), because they imply that there is a need for a better grasp of 
financial issues even among households that have already invested in stocks directly. Even 
though such households are typically wealthier, better educated, and more financially 
sophisticated than average, only a small minority among them seems to perceive the benefits of 
international diversification and thus invests in foreign stocks. Awareness of such benefits can 
increase the portfolio performance for households that already participate in the stock market, as 
well as make stockholding more appealing for households that do not own any stocks.33
References
Ahearne AG, Griever WL, Warnock FE. 2004. Information Costs and Home Bias: an Analysis of 
US Holdings of Foreign Equities. Journal of International Economics 62: 313-336.
Aizcorbe A, Kennickell A, Moore K. 2003. Recent changes in U.S. family finances: evidence 
from the 1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances. Federal Reserve Bulletin 89: 1-32.  
Alessie R, Hochguertel S, van Soest A. 2004. Ownership of stocks and mutual Funds: a panel 
data analysis. The Review of Economics and Statistics 86: 783-796. 
Alessie R, Lusardi A, Van Rooij M. 2007. Financial Literacy and Stock Market Participation. 
MRRC Working Paper No. 2007-162 
Amadi AA, Bergin PR. 2006. Understanding International Portfolio Diversification and 
Turnover Rates. NBER Working Paper No. 12473. 
Ammer JM, Holland SB, Smith DC, Warnock FE. 2006. Look at Me Now: What Attracts US 
Shareholders? NBER Working Paper No. 12500. 
Baele L, Pungulescu C, Ter Horst J. 2007. Model Uncertainty, Financial Market Integration and 
the Home Bias Puzzle. Journal of International Money and Finance 26: 606-630. 
Bailey W, Kumar A, Ng D. 2008. Foreign Investments of U.S. Individual Investors: Causes and 
Consequences. Management Science 54: 443-459. 
Barber B, Odean T. 2000. Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The Common Stock 
Investment Performance of Individual Investors. Journal of Finance 55: 773–806.
Bertaut C, Starr-McCluer M. 2002. Household portfolios in the United States. In Household 
Portfolios, Guiso L, Haliassos M, Jappelli T (eds). MIT: Cambridge. 
Bilias J, Georgarakos D, Haliassos M. 2008. Equity culture and the distribution of wealth. 
Working paper, Goethe University Frankfurt. 
Bogan V. 2008. Stock market participation and the Internet. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 43: 191-212.
Bohn H, Tesar L. 1996. US equity Investment in Foreign Markets: Portfolio Rebalancing or 
Return Chasing? American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 86: 77-81. 
Burger JD, Warnock FE. 2006. Local currency bond markets. IMF Staff Papers 53: 133-146. 
Cai F, Warnock FE. 2006. International Diversification at Home and Abroad. NBER Working 
Paper No. 12220. 
Campbell J. 2006. Household Finance. Journal of Finance 61: 1553 – 1604. 34
Cappellari L, Jenkins SP. 2006. Calculation of multivariate normal probabilities by simulation, 
with applications to maximum simulated likelihood estimation. The Stata Journal 6: 156-
189.
Caskey J,   Peterson A. 1994. Who has a bank account and who doesn't: 1977 and 1989. 
Eastern Economic Journal 20: 61-73. 
Choe H, Kho B, Stulz RM. 2005. Do domestic investors have an edge? The trading experience of 
foreign investors in Korea. Review of Financial Studies 18: 795-829. 
Christelis D, Georgarakos D., Haliassos M. 2009. “Stockholding: From Participation to Location 
and to Participation Spillovers”. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1356979 
Cocco J, Gomes F, Maenhout P. 2005. Consumption and Portfolio Choice over the Life Cycle. 
Review of Financial Studies 18: 491-533. 
Covrig VM, Defond ML, Hung M. 2007. Home Bias, Foreign Mutual Fund Holdings, and the 
Voluntary Adoption of International Accounting Standards. Journal of Accounting 
Research 45: 41–70. 
Dahlquist M, Pinkowitz L, Stulz R, Williamson R. 2003. Corporate Governance, and the Home 
Bias. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38: 87-110. 
Dvorak T. 2005. Do Domestic Investors Have an Information Advantage? Evidence from 
Indonesia. Journal of Finance, vol. 60: 817-838. 
Errunza V, Hogan K, Hung M. 1999. Can the Gains from International Diversification be 
achieved without Trading Abroad? Journal of Finance 54: 2075-2107. 
Fidora M, Fratzscher M, Thimann C. 2007. Home Bias in Global Bond and Equity M Markets: 
The role of Real Exchange Rate Volatility. Journal of International Money and Finance
26: 631-655. 
French KR, Poterba JM. 1991. Investor Diversification and International Equity Markets. 
American Economic Review 81: 222-226. 
Gelos RG, Wei S. 2005. Transparency and International Portfolio Holdings. Journal of Finance
60: 2987-3020. 
Geweke J. 1989. Bayesian inference in econometric models using Monte Carlo integration, 
Econometrica 57: 1317–1339. 
Graham JR, Harvey CR, Huang H. 2005. Investor Competence, Trading Frequency, and Home 
Bias. NBER Working Paper No. 11426. 35
Greene, W. 1998. Sample selection in credit-scoring models. Japan and the World Economy 10:
299-316.
Greene, W. 2007. Censored data and truncated distributions. In The Palgrave Handbook of 
Econometrics Volume 1: Econometric Theory, T.C. Mills. and C. Patterson, (eds.),  695-
736. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Grinblatt M, Keloharju M. 2000. The Investment Behavior, and Performance of Various Investor 
Types: A Study of Finland’s Unique Data Set. Journal of Financial Economics 55: 43-67. 
Guiso L, Haliassos M, Jappelli T (eds). 2002. Household Portfolios. MIT: Cambridge, UK. 
Guiso L, Jappelli T. 2005. Awareness and stock market participation. Review of Finance 9: 537-
567.
Haliassos M, Bertaut C. 1995. Why do so few hold stocks? Economic Journal 105:. 1110-1129. 
Haliassos M, Michaelides A. 2003. Portfolio choice and liquidity constraints. International
Economic Review 44: 143-177. 
Hogarth J, Anguelov C, Lee J. 2004. Why don’t households have a checking account? Journal of 
Consumer Affairs 38: 1-34. 
Hong HG, Kubik JD, Stein JC. 2004. Social interaction and stock market participation. Journal
of Finance 59: 137-163. 
Investment Company Institute. 2004. Mutual Funds and the U.S. Retirement Market in 2003. 
Fundamentals 13: 1-20.  
Jenkins SP, Capellari L, Lynn P, Jäckle A, Sala E. 2006. Patterns of consent: evidence from a 
general household survey. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society A 169: 701-722. 
Karlsson, A, Nordén L. 2007. Home sweet home: Home bias and international diversification 
among individual investors. Journal of Banking and Finance 31: 317-333. 
Keane  M.  1994.  A  computationally  practical  simulation  estimator  for  panel  data.           
Econometrica 62: 95–116. 
Kennickell A. 2000. Wealth Measurement in the Survey of Consumer Finances: Methodology 
and Directions for Future Research. Working Paper, Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve Board.
Kilka M, Weber M. 2000. Home-Bias in International Stock Return Expectations. Journal of 
Psychology and Financial Markets 1: 176-193. 36
Kyrychenko V, Shum P. 2006. Foreign contents in US household portfolios. Working Paper, 
York University. 
La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A, Vishny R. 1999. Corporate Ownership around the 
world. Journal of Finance 54: 471-515. 
Leuz C, Lins KV, Warnock FE. 2005. Do Foreigners Invest Less in Poorly Governed Firms?
NBER Working Paper No. 12222. 
Lewis KK. 1999. Trying to explain home bias in equities and consumption. Journal of Economic 
Literature 37: 571-608. 
Li KH, Raghunathan TE, Rubin DB. 1991. Large sample significance levels from multiply 
imputed data using moment-based statistics and an F reference distribution. Journal of the 
American Statistical Association 86: 1065-73. 
Lusardi A, Mitchell O. 2007. Baby Boomer Retirement Security: The roles of planning, financial 
literacy, and housing wealth. Journal of Monetary Economics 54: 205-224. 
Michaelides A. 2003. International portfolio choice, liquidity constraints and the home equity 
bias puzzle. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 28: 555-594. 
New York Stock Exchange. 2001. Shareownership 2000. New York: New York Stock 
Exchange.
Perraudin WRM, Sorensen BE. 2000. The demand for risky assets: sample selection and 
household portfolios. Journal of Econometrics 97: 117-144. 
Rhine S, Greene W, Toussaint-Comeau M. 2006. The importance of check-cashing businesses to 
the unbanked: racial/ethnic differences. The Review of Economics and Statistics  88: 146–
157.
Rhine S, Toussaint-Comeau M, Greene W, Hogarth J. 2001. The Role of Alternative Financial 
Service providers in Serving Low- and Moderate Income Neighborhoods. Changing
Financial Markets and Community Development Conference Proceedings.
Rosen H, Wu S. 2004. Portfolio choice and health status. Journal of Financial Economics 72:
457-484.
Rubin DB. 1987. Multiple Imputation for Nonresponse in Surveys. Wiley: New York.  
Schmidt, P. 1981. “Further results on the value of sample separation information”. Econometrica
49:1339-1343. 37
Strong N, Xu X. 2003. Understanding the Equity Home Bias: Evidence from Survey Data 
Review of Economics and Statistics 85: 307-312. 
Stulz R. 2005. The Limits to Globalization. Journal of Finance 60: 1595-1639. 
Tesar LL, Werner I. 1995. Home Bias and High Turnover. Journal of International Money and 
Finance 14: 467-492. 
Train K. 2003. Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation. Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge. 
Van de Ven, WPMM, Van Praag BMS. 1981. The Demand for Deductibles in Private Health 
Insurance: a Probit Model with Sample Selection. Journal of Econometrics 17: 229–252. 
Vissing-Jorgensen, A. 2002. Towards an explanation of household portfolio choice 
heterogeneity: nonfinancial income and participation cost structures, NBER Working Paper 
No. 8884. 38
Appendix A: Estimates and Standard Errors of Probabilities and Marginal Effects 
As in Jenkins et al. (2006) we use the indices kT=2T-1 for T {S, FS, B, FB, A, FA}, 
and represent the q-variate normal distribution by Nq(.). As an example, if the household holds 
directly any stocks then kS=1, while if the household has (not) any foreign stocks kFS=1 (-1). On 
the other hand, if the household does not own any stocks directly then kS=-1 and the equation for 
foreign stocks (equation (2)) does not appear in the likelihood term of that particular household. 
The equations for bonds and liquid accounts and their foreign counterparts appear in the 
likelihood in an analogous fashion. As a result, the likelihood terms corresponding to the eight 
possible cases of first-stage asset holdings can be written as follows (dropping for simplicity the 
subscript i denoting households): 
1) The household holds directly neither stocks, nor bonds nor liquid accounts: 
) , , ; , , ( 3 1 QH XH XQ U U U ] J D A B A S B S A B S k k k k k k X k G k C k N L c c c                                            (A.1) 
 with kS= kB= kA =  1 
2)  The household invests directly in stocks but does not hold directly any bonds and does 
not have liquid accounts: 
) , ,
, , , ; , , , ( 4 2
H Q X
QH XH XQ
U U U
U U U ] J E D
u A FS u B FS u FS S
A B A S B S A B FS S
k k k k k k
k k k k k k X k G k D k C k N L c c c c  
                                   (A.2) 
with   kS= 1, kB= kA =  1  , kFS =  1 r                                                                                                              
3) The household invests directly in bonds but does not hold directly any stocks and does 
not have liquid accounts: 
) , ,
, , , ; , , , ( 4 3
H Q X
QH XH XQ
U U U
U U U ] G J D
n A FB n FB B n FB S
A B A S B S A FB B S
k k k k k k
k k k k k k X k H k G k C k N L c c c c  
                                  (A.3) 
with kB= 1, kS= kA = 1  , kFB =  1 r
4)  The household has liquid accounts but holds directly neither stocks nor bonds: 39
) , ,
, , , ; , , , ( 4 4
e FA A e FA B e FA S
A B A S B S FA A B S
k k k k k k
k k k k k k Y k X k G k C k N L
H Q X
QH XH XQ
U U U
U U U T ] J D c c c c  
                          (A.4)
with  kA= 1, kS=  kB =  1  , kFA =  1 r                                                                                                             
5) The  household  holds  directly  both  stocks  and  bonds  but  has  no  liquid  accounts:                       
) , , , , , ,
, , , ; , , , , ( 5 5
un FB FS n A FB n FB B n FB S u A FS u B FS u FS S
A B A S B S A FB B FS S
k k k k k k k k k k k k k k
k k k k k k X k H k G k D k C k N L
U U U U U U U
U U U ] G J E D
H Q X H Q X
QH XH XQ c c c c c  
                        (A.5) 
with kA= 1  , kS=  kB =1, kFS =  1 r , kFB =  1 r
6)  The household holds directly bonds, has liquid accounts but has no direct stock holdings: 
) , , , , , ,
, , , ; , , , , ( 5 6
ne FA FB e FA A e FA B e FA S n A FB n FB B n FB S
A B A S B S FA A FB B S
k k k k k k k k k k k k k k
k k k k k k Y k X k H k G k C k N L
U U U U U U U
U U U T ] G J D
H Q X H Q X
QH XH XQ c c c c c  
                     (A.6) 
with kS= 1  , kB= kA =1, kFB =  1 r , kFA =  1 r
7) The household holds directly stocks and has liquid accounts but has no direct bond 
holdings:
) , , , , , ,
, , , ; , , , , ( 5 7
ue FA FS e FA A e FA B e FA S u A FS u B FS u FS S
A B A S B S FA A B FS S
k k k k k k k k k k k k k k
k k k k k k Y k X k G k D k C k N L
U U U U U U U
U U U T ] J E D
H Q X H Q X
QH XH XQ c c c c c  
                        (A.7) 
with kB= 1  , kS= kA =1, kFS =  1 r , kFA =  1 r                                                                                               
8)  The household holds directly stocks and bonds and has liquid accounts: 
) , , , ,
, , , , , , , ,
, , ; , , , , , ( 6 8
ue FA FS ne FA FB un FB FS e FA A e FA B
e FA S n A FB n FB B n FB S u A FS u B FS u FS S A B
A S B S FA A FB B FS S
k k k k k k k k k k
k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k
k k k k Y k X k H k G k D k C k N L
U U U U U
U U U U U U U U
U U T ] G J E D
H Q
X H Q X H Q X QH
XH XQ c c c c c c  
                      (A.8) 
with kS= kB= kA= 1, kFA =  1 r , kFB =  1 r , kFA =  1 r
Thus the overall contribution to the log likelihood by a given household is equal to  
8 7 6
5 4 3
2 1
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Appendix B: Estimates and Standard Errors of Probabilities and Marginal Effects 
Since probabilities, marginal effects and semi-elasticities are nonlinear functions g(ȥ ˆ ) of 
the estimated parameters  ) ȡ , ș ˆ , ȗ ˆ , į ˆ , Ȗ ˆ , ȕ ˆ , Į ˆ ( ȥ ˆ

  , we compute  their point estimates (expected 
values) and standard errors using Monte Carlo simulation (Train, 2003), that is  
\ \ \ \ d f g g E ) ( ) ( )) ( ( ³                                                                                             (B.1) 
where f(ȥ) denotes the joint distribution of all the elements in ȥ. We implement this 
simulation estimator by drawing from the distribution of the parameters ȥ ˆ  under the assumption 
that they are distributed asymptotically normally with means and variance-covariance matrix 
equal to the maximum likelihood estimates. At each parameter draw we generate for all 
households probabilities and marginal effects and then calculate g(ȥ ˆ ) as their weighted average 
(median) across households.
1 We then estimate E(g(ȥ)) as the average of g(ȥ ˆ ) across draws, and 
the standard error of g(ȥ) as the standard deviation of the distribution of g(ȥ ˆ ) across draws.
Appendix C: Estimates and Standard Errors of Probabilities and Marginal Effects 
The predicted population proportions are obtained as follows: 
1)  Using the Monte Carlo draws of the estimated coefficients, as discussed in Appendix B 
above, we compute the  probability of a given asset choice for every household at a given 
coefficient draw.  
2)  For each household, we randomly draw a number from a (0,1) uniform distribution, and 
if it is smaller than the predicted probability we predict that the household makes the 
                                                
1 We avoid evaluating probabilities or marginal effects at sample means/medians since this practice can lead to 
severely biased results (see Train, 2003, pp. 33-34). 41
asset choice, while the opposite happens if the random number is greater than the 
predicted probability. Repeating this procedure for all households allows us to compute 
the predicted proportion of households that make the asset choice, for a given draw of the 
coefficients. 
We repeat 1) and 2) for every coefficient draw and obtain point estimates and standard 
errors of predicted proportions by simulation as described in Appendix B.42
Table 1. Prevalence of Asset Ownership 
Year
Directly
held
stocks
Foreign
stocks
(among
stock
owners)
Directly
held
bonds
Foreign
bonds
(among
bond
owners)
Liquid
accounts
Foreign
liquid
accounts
(among
liquid
account
owners)
       
1.2 0.2 1.5 
1995 15.3
(8.0) 
24.7
(0.8) 
87.4
(1.7) 
2.1 0.1 1.8 
1998 19.2
(10.9) 
21.5
(0.4) 
90.6
(2.0) 
2.1 0.2 3.1 
2001 21.3
(9.7) 
18.8
(0.9) 
91.4
(3.4) 
2.4 0.1 2.7 
2004 20.7
(11.5) 
18.8
(0.4) 
91.3
(2.9) 
                    
Notes: SCF 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004, weighted data. The reported statistics are 
corrected for multiple imputation. Liquid Accounts include all types of 
transaction accounts (checking, savings, money market and call) comprising 
even the few of those with zero reported balances. Stocks refer to directly held 
stocks which are publicly traded. Bonds include US government savings bonds 
and other types of bonds (tax-exempt, mortgage-backed, US 
government/agency and other).   43
Table 2. Combinations of Foreign Asset 
Investment among Foreign Asset Owners 
Foreign
stocks
Foreign
bonds
Foreign
liquid
accounts
Percentage
owning the 
combination
      
Yes No  No  42.8 
No Yes No  2.3 
No No Yes  51.0 
Yes Yes  No  0.5 
No Yes Yes  0.4 
Yes No  Yes  2.9 
Yes Yes  Yes  0.0 
           
Notes: See Table 1. 44
Table 3. Distribution of Household Characteristics 
Variable Whole
sample
Owns only 
foreign
stocks
Has only 
foreign
liquid
accounts
     
Age (mean)  48.9 53.6 48.9 
High school graduate  0.509 0.297 0.481 
College degree or more  0.337 0.683 0.430 
Married 0.588 0.676 0.629 
Single male  0.140 0.176 0.148 
Has children  0.435 0.378 0.394 
White 0.762 0.898 0.795 
Poor health  0.061 0.019 0.033 
Uses Internet to obtain financial information  0.111 0.260 0.147 
Asks Friends/Relatives/Work contacts for 
financial information  0.360 0.331 0.358 
Extensively "shops around"  0.157 0.239 0.156 
Expects US economy to do better  0.312 0.335 0.339 
Expects US economy to do worse  0.251 0.224 0.229 
Expects US interest rates to go higher  0.683 0.680 0.614 
Expects US interest rates to go lower  0.063 0.064 0.079 
Expects future income to rise faster than prices  0.220 0.277 0.237 
Expects future income to rise lower than prices  0.305 0.280 0.299 
Investment horizon > 10 yrs  0.143 0.236 0.125 
Willingness to take above average financial risk  0.205 0.447 0.298 
Intention to leave a bequest  0.293 0.542 0.301 
Has received inheritance  0.199 0.459 0.196 
Credit constrained  0.224 0.076 0.189 
Last year's income unexpectedly low  0.171 0.162 0.156 
Works/ed  in the Financial Sector  0.204 0.259 0.253 
Saves for "rainy days"  0.300 0.297 0.324 
Self-employed 0.113 0.209 0.138 
Retired 0.240 0.233 0.213 
Unemployed/Inactive 0.051 0.025 0.047 
Non-investment income (median)  37,788 69,076 44,153 
Net real wealth (median)  57,968 219,359 68,783 
Net financial wealth (median)  9,943 384,092  27,920 
           
Notes: SCF 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004, weighted data. The reported statistics are corrected 
for multiple imputation. Numbers denote prevalence, except for age (mean), non-
investment income, net real wealth, net financial wealth (medians in 2004 prices). 45
Table 4. Model Specification 
Eqn.  Outcome    Latent propensities  Observed binary outcomes 
For each respondent i = 1, …, N:   
(1)       Owns any Stocks  i i i C S X D  c  
* ) 0 (
* !   i i S I S
(2)  Owns Foreign Stocks  i i i u D FS  c   E
* ) 0 (
* !   i i FS I FS  if Si=1, else unobserved
(3)  Owns any Bonds  i i i G B Q J   
' * ) 0 (
* !   i i B I B
(4)  Owns Foreign Bonds  i i i n H FB  c   G
* ) 0 (
* !   i i FB I FB  if Bi=1, else unobserved
(5)  Has any Liquid  i i i X A H ]  c  
* ) 0 (
* !   i i A I A
Accounts
(6) Has  Foreign    i i i e Y FA  c   T
*
             ) 0 (
* !   i i FA I FA  if Ai=1, else unobserved 
Liquid Accounts     
(7)  Error terms  (ȣi, ui, vi,n i,İi,e i) ~ N(0, ȍ),
where ȍ  is a symmetric matrix with typical element ȡij = ȡji  for i, j {ȣ, u, v, n,İ,e}
and i  j, and ȡjj = 1, for all j, and N6 denotes a 6-variate normal distribution. The errors in 
each equation are assumed to be orthogonal to the predictors 
Notes:  I(.) is the indicator function equal to one if its argument is true, and zero if false.  4
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Table 6. Observed and Predicted Population Proportions of Asset Owners 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
Independent two-
stage probits with 
selection 
Multivariate probit 
with selection  Choices
Data
Estimate Std.
Error Estimate Std.
Error
                 
Directly owns any stocks, 
unconditional  0.192   0.214  0.004 ***  0.213  0.005 ***
Directly owns any bonds, 
unconditional  0.209   0.214  0.004 ***  0.214  0.005 ***
Has any liquid accounts, 
unconditional  0.903   0.903  0.003 ***  0.904  0.003 ***
Directly owns foreign stocks | 
directly owns any stocks  0.102   0.078  0.057 *  0.118  0.010 ***
Directly owns foreign bonds | 
directly owns any bonds  0.007   0.088  0.181    0.011  0.004 ***
Has foreign liquid accounts | has 
any liquid accounts  0.025   0.026  0.003 ***  0.026  0.003 ***
Directly owns any stocks | directly 
owns any bonds  0.359   0.214  0.004 ***  0.402  0.012 ***
Directly owns any bonds | directly 
owns any stocks  0.391   0.214  0.004 ***  0.408  0.012 ***
Directly owns foreign stocks | has 
foreign liquid accounts  0.055   0.017  0.012 *  0.064  0.020 ***
Directly owns foreign bonds | 
directly owns foreign stocks  0.011   0.019  0.039    0.023  0.009 ***
Has foreign liquid accounts | 
directly owns foreign stocks  0.064   0.024  0.003 ***  0.067  0.020 ***
Owns any foreign asset  0.042    0.057  0.040 *    0.048  0.004 ***
Directly owns foreign stocks | 
owns any foreign asset  0.463   0.275  0.207 *  0.491  0.031 ***
Directly owns foreign bonds | owns 
any foreign asset  0.032   0.195  0.211    0.045  0.012 ***
Has foreign liquid accounts | owns 
any foreign asset  0.544   0.555  0.226 ***  0.507  0.029 ***
               
Notes: Estimates and standard errors account for multiple imputation in the SCF, using the 
results in Rubin (1987). ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. P-
values are derived from one-sided tests of significance.48
Table 7.  Average Marginal Effects – Stocks 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Two-stage probit with selection  Multivariate probit with selection 
Owns directly any 
stocks 
Owns directly 
foreign stocks 
(conditional on 
directly owning any 
stocks) 
Owns directly any 
stocks 
Owns directly foreign 
stocks (conditional on 
directly owning any 
stocks) 
Variables
Marg. 
Eff. Std. Error   Marg. 
Eff.
Std.
Error
Marg. 
Eff.  Std. Error     Marg. 
Eff. Std. Error
                         
Age 0.001  0.000 ***  0.001  0.001    0.001  0.000  ***   0.001  0.000 ** 
High school graduate  0.080  0.009 ***  0.019  0.026    0.082  0.009  ***   0.033  0.027  
College degree or more  0.176  0.010 ***  0.029  0.029    0.179  0.011  ***   0.047  0.026 * 
Married 0.048 0.008 ***  -0.010  0.016     0.048 0.009  ***   -0.014 0.015  
Single male  0.031  0.011 ***  0.016  0.018    0.028  0.011  ***   0.021  0.021  
Has children  -0.013 0.006 **   0.000  0.008     -0.014 0.006  **   0.000 0.009  
White 0.065 0.007 ***  -0.011  0.019     0.067 0.007  ***   -0.016 0.018  
Self-employed  0.001  0.006    0.009  0.011    0.001  0.007     0.000  0.003  
Retired 0.029 0.010 ***  -0.006  0.013     0.027 0.011  ***   -0.009 0.004 ** 
Unemployed/Inactive  0.033  0.018 *  0.008  0.025    0.031  0.017  *  -0.010  0.006 * 
Poor health  -0.044  0.015 ***  -0.006  0.028    -0.046  0.018  ***   -0.014  0.027  
Uses Internet to obtain financial 
information  0.068  0.009 ***  0.018  0.013    0.070  0.009  ***   0.026  0.011 ** 
Asks Friends/Relatives/Work 
contacts for financial information 
0.001 0.006    -0.016  0.014     0.002 0.006     -0.026 0.009 ***
Extensively "shops around"  0.004  0.007    0.016  0.014    0.004  0.007     0.025  0.012 ** 
Expects US economy to do better  -0.002 0.006     0.003  0.008     -0.002 0.006      0.004 0.010  
Expects US economy to do worse  0.010  0.007    0.011  0.011    0.010  0.007     0.014  0.012  
Expects US interest rates to go higher  0.002 0.007    -0.001  0.008     0.002 0.006     -0.001 0.009  
Expects US interest rates to go lower  -0.005 0.012     0.014  0.019     -0.004 0.013      0.025 0.022  
Expects future income to rise faster 
than prices 
0.019  0.007 ***  0.007  0.009    0.018  0.007  ***   0.008  0.009  
Expects future income to rise lower 
than prices 
0.007  0.006    0.004  0.010    0.005  0.006     0.006  0.011  
Investment horizon > 10 yrs  0.024  0.007 ***  0.015  0.012    0.025  0.008  ***   0.021  0.009 ** 
Willingness to take above average 
financial risk  0.086  0.007 ***  0.028  0.018    0.087  0.007  ***   0.043  0.008 ***
Non-investment income  0.006 0.001 ***  -0.001  0.001     0.006 0.001  ***   -0.002 0.001  
Net real wealth  0.022  0.001 ***  0.006  0.005    0.022  0.002  ***   0.010  0.002 ***
Net financial wealth  0.006  0.000 ***  0.002  0.002    0.006  0.000  ***   0.003  0.001 ***
Intention to leave a bequest  0.065  0.006 ***  0.024  0.017    0.066  0.007  ***   0.035  0.010 ***
Has received inheritance  0.043  0.007 ***  0.020  0.015    0.044  0.006  ***   0.029  0.009 ***
Credit constrained  -0.004  0.008    -0.019  0.019    -0.005  0.009     -0.027  0.016 * 
Last year's income unexpectedly low  -0.012 0.008     0.015  0.017     -0.011 0.007      0.022 0.014  
Works/ed  in the Financial Sector  0.041  0.007 ***  0.001  0.008    0.042  0.007  ***   0.000  0.009  
Year 1998  0.015 0.008 *   -0.006  0.011     0.015 0.008  *   -0.009 0.012  
Year 2001  0.012 0.008    -0.012  0.013     0.011 0.008     -0.016 0.012  
Year 2004  -0.001  0.008    -0.009  0.013    -0.001  0.008     -0.013  0.013  
Saves for "rainy days"  -0.009 0.006     -..-  -..-    -0.009 0.006      -..-  -..- 
                                         
Notes: Median semi-elasticities are shown for net investment income, and net financial and net real wealth, average marginal effects for the remaining 
covariates. Estimates and standard errors account for multiple imputation in the SCF, using the results in Rubin (1987). ***,**,* denote significance 
at 1%,5% and 10% respectively.49
Table 8.  Average Marginal Effects – Bonds 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Two-stage probit with selection  Multivariate probit with selection 
Owns directly any 
bonds
Owns directly 
foreign bonds 
(conditional on 
directly owning any 
bonds)
Owns directly any 
bonds
Owns directly 
foreign bonds 
(conditional on 
directly owning any 
bonds)
Variables
Marg. 
Eff. Std. Error   Marg. 
Eff.
Std.
Error
Marg. 
Eff. Std. Error     Marg. 
Eff. 
Std.
Error
                         
Age 0.000  0.000    0.001  0.002    0.000  0.000     0.000 0.000  
High school graduate  0.090  0.009 ***   -0.021  0.060     0.090  0.009 ***   -0.003  0.007  
College degree or more  0.138  0.010 ***   -0.008  0.061     0.141  0.010 ***   0.008  0.008  
Married 0.063  0.009 ***   -0.013  0.030     0.063  0.008 ***   0.000  0.005  
Single male  0.014  0.012    0.003  0.029    0.011  0.010     0.002 0.007  
Has children  0.093  0.007 ***   -0.010  0.030     0.093  0.007 ***   0.001  0.003  
White 0.100  0.007 ***   -0.018  0.043     0.102  0.007 ***   -0.001  0.006  
Self-employed  -0.039  0.007 ***   0.010  0.023     -0.039  0.008 ***   0.001  0.001 **
Retired -0.007  0.010    -0.004  0.022    -0.006  0.010     0.000 0.000  
Unemployed/Inactive  -0.010  0.016    0.008  0.056     -0.012  0.016     0.000  0.001  
Poor health  -0.047  0.016 ***   -..-  -..-    -0.045  0.015 ***   -..-  -..- 
Uses Internet to obtain financial 
information  0.026  0.010 ***  0.006  0.023    0.029  0.010  ***   0.007 0.005  
Asks Friends/Relatives/Work contacts 
for financial information  0.015  0.006 **   -0.008  0.014     0.015  0.006  **   -0.003  0.003  
Extensively "shops around"  0.002  0.007    -0.001 0.016     0.003  0.007     0.000  0.003  
Expects US economy to do better  -0.006  0.007    0.007  0.014     -0.005  0.007     0.004  0.003  
Expects US economy to do worse  0.001  0.007    0.003  0.015    0.000  0.007     0.002 0.003  
Expects US interest rates to go higher  0.002  0.006    -0.004 0.014     0.002  0.007     -0.003  0.003  
Expects US interest rates to go lower  0.012  0.014    -0.007 0.029     0.012  0.013     -0.003  0.004  
Expects future income to rise faster 
than prices  -0.004  0.007    0.002  0.015     -0.004  0.007     0.001  0.003  
Expects future income to rise lower 
than prices 
0.013  0.007 *  -0.004  0.016    0.013  0.007  *  -0.001  0.003  
Investment horizon > 10 yrs  0.028  0.008 ***   -0.001  0.015     0.030  0.008 ***   0.002  0.002  
Willingness to take above average 
financial risk 
-0.001  0.007    -0.002 0.012     0.000  0.006     -0.002  0.002  
Non-investment income  0.003  0.001 *  -0.001  0.002    0.003  0.001  **   0.000 0.000  
Net real wealth  0.011  0.001 ***  0.000  0.005    0.011  0.001  ***   0.001 0.001  
Net financial wealth  0.006  0.000 ***  0.000  0.007    0.006  0.000  ***   0.001 0.001  
Intention to leave a bequest  0.049  0.006 ***  0.001  0.022    0.051  0.007  ***   0.005 0.003  
Has received inheritance  0.028  0.007 ***   -0.007  0.015     0.028  0.007 ***   -0.003  0.002  
Credit constrained  -0.020  0.008 **   -0.001  0.031    -0.020  0.009  **   -0.001 0.006  
Last year's income unexpectedly low  -0.022  0.008 ***   0.011  0.019     -0.022  0.008 ***   0.005  0.004  
Works/ed  in the Financial Sector  0.008  0.007    0.001  0.012    0.009  0.007     0.001 0.002  
Year 1998  -0.040  0.008 ***  -0.008  0.023    -0.040  0.008  ***   -0.008 0.004 **
Year 2001  -0.082  0.009 ***   0.000  0.034     -0.080  0.008 ***   -0.008  0.004 * 
Year 2004  -0.075  0.009 ***  -0.005  0.032    -0.074  0.008  ***   -0.009 0.004 **
Saves for "rainy days"  -0.004  0.005   -..-  -..-   -0.005  0.006    -..-  -..- 
                                         
Notes: Median semi-elasticities are shown for net investment income, and net financial and net real wealth, average marginal effects for the remaining 
covariates. Estimates and standard errors account for multiple imputation in the SCF, using the results in Rubin (1987). ***,**,* denote significance at 
1%,5% and 10% respectively.50
Table 9.  Average Marginal Effects – Liquid Accounts 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Two-stage probit with selection  Multivariate probit with selection 
Has any liquid 
accounts
Has foreign liquid 
accounts (conditional 
on having any liquid 
accounts)
Has any liquid 
accounts
Has foreign liquid 
accounts (conditional 
on having any liquid 
accounts)
Variables
Marg. 
Eff. Std. Error   Marg. 
Eff.  Std. Error   Marg. 
Eff.  Std. Error     Marg. 
Eff. Std. Error
                         
Age 0.001 0.000 ***   0.000 0.000     0.001 0.000  ***    0.000 0.000  
High school graduate  0.094 0.009 ***   0.002 0.005     0.093 0.008  ***    0.000 0.005  
College degree or more  0.149 0.009 ***   0.008 0.006     0.146 0.009  ***    0.007 0.005  
Married 0.004  0.005    -0.002  0.004    0.003  0.005     -0.001  0.004  
Single male  -0.026 0.008 ***   0.003 0.005     -0.025 0.008  ***    0.003 0.005  
Has children  -0.010 0.005 **   -0.003 0.003     -0.009 0.005  **   -0.003 0.003  
White 0.059 0.006 ***  -0.002 0.004     0.058 0.006  ***   -0.003 0.004  
Self-employed  -0.002 0.007     -0.002 0.003     -0.002 0.007      0.000 0.000  
Retired -0.029 0.009 ***   -0.007 0.004 *    -0.028 0.008  ***    0.000 0.000  
Unemployed/Inactive  -0.023 0.009 ***   0.001 0.008     -0.023 0.009  **   0.000 0.000  
Poor health  -0.024 0.009 ***   -0.004 0.007     -0.024 0.010  **   -0.004 0.007  
Uses Internet to obtain financial 
information  0.038 0.007 ***   0.000 0.004     0.036 0.008  ***    0.000 0.004  
Asks Friends/Relatives/Work contacts 
for financial information  0.003 0.004     0.001 0.003     0.003 0.004      0.001 0.003  
Extensively "shops around"  -0.003 0.006     -0.001 0.003     -0.003 0.006      -0.002 0.003  
Expects US economy to do better  0.000  0.005    0.001  0.003    -0.001  0.005     0.001  0.003  
Expects US economy to do worse  -0.023 0.005 ***   0.002 0.003     -0.022 0.005  ***    0.002 0.003  
Expects US interest rates to go higher  -0.007 0.005     -0.007 0.003 **   -0.007 0.005      -0.006 0.003 ** 
Expects US interest rates to go lower  -0.012  0.009    0.003  0.007    -0.011  0.010     0.004  0.006  
Expects future income to rise faster than 
prices 0.001 0.006     0.005 0.003     0.001 0.006      0.004 0.003  
Expects future income to rise lower than 
prices
0.012 0.005 **    0.001 0.003     0.013 0.005  ***    0.000 0.003  
Investment horizon > 10 yrs  0.012  0.007    -0.001  0.003    0.012  0.007  *    -0.001  0.003  
Willingness to take above average 
financial risk 
0.017 0.006 ***   0.006 0.003 **    0.016 0.006  ***    0.006 0.003 ** 
Non-investment income  0.004 0.000 ***   0.000 0.000     0.004 0.000  ***    0.000 0.001  
Net real wealth  0.004 0.000 ***   0.001 0.000 **    0.005 0.000  ***    0.001 0.000 * 
Net financial wealth  0.000 0.000 ***   0.000 0.000     0.000 0.000  ***    0.000 0.000  
Intention to leave a bequest  0.020 0.005 ***  -0.001 0.003     0.020 0.005  ***   -0.001 0.003  
Has received inheritance  0.019 0.006 ***   0.002 0.003     0.019 0.007  ***    0.002 0.003  
Credit constrained  -0.014 0.005 ***   -0.002 0.004     -0.015 0.005  ***    -0.002 0.004  
Last year's income unexpectedly low  -0.018 0.006 ***   0.002 0.004     -0.019 0.006  ***    0.002 0.004  
Works/ed  in the Financial Sector  0.015 0.006 ***   0.005 0.003 *    0.014 0.006  **    0.005 0.003 * 
Year 1998  0.023 0.006 ***   0.001 0.003     0.023 0.006  ***    0.001 0.003  
Year 2001  0.024 0.006 ***   0.013 0.004 ***   0.025 0.006  ***    0.012 0.004 ***
Year 2004  0.015 0.006 ***   0.010 0.004 ***   0.015 0.006  **    0.009 0.004 ** 
Saves for "rainy days"  0.023 0.004 ***   -..-  -..-    0.022 0.004  ***    -..-  -..- 
                                       
Notes: Median semi-elasticities are shown for net investment income, and net financial and net real wealth, average marginal effects for the remaining 
covariates. Estimates and standard errors account for multiple imputation in the SCF, using the results in Rubin (1987). ***,**,* denote significance at 
1%,5% and 10% respectively.51
Table 10. Average Marginal Effects conditional on any Foreign Asset Ownership 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
     Holds directly foreign 
stocks conditional on 
holding any foreign 
asset 
Holds directly foreign 
bonds conditional on 
holding any foreign 
asset 
Has foreign liquid 
accounts conditional 
on holding any 
foreign asset 
Variables
Marg. 
Eff. Std. Error   Marg. 
Eff. Std. Error   Marg. 
Eff. Std. Error
                               
Age 0.001 0.001     0.001 0.001    -0.001 0.001  
High school graduate  0.168 0.073 **   -0.010  0.025    -0.148  0.064 ** 
College degree or more  0.203 0.072 ***   0.027 0.028    -0.202 0.066 ***
Married  0.021 0.037     0.009 0.016    -0.027 0.037  
Single male  0.042 0.044     0.002 0.020    -0.037 0.045  
Has children  -0.002  0.028    0.024 0.013 *  -0.020  0.026  
White 0.045 0.039     0.014 0.017    -0.054 0.035  
Self-employed  0.002  0.002    -0.002  0.001    -0.001   
Retired  0.006 0.007     0.000 0.001    -0.004   
Unemployed/Inactive  0.005  0.008    -0.001  0.001    -0.004   
Poor health  -0.043 0.080     -..-  -..-    0.027 0.070  
Uses Internet to obtain financial 
information 0.089 0.031 ***   0.017 0.016    -0.095 0.033 ***
Asks Friends/Relatives/Work contacts 
for financial information  -0.051  0.028 *  -0.005  0.011    0.053 0.026 * 
Extensively "shops around"  0.061 0.028 **   -0.005  0.010    -0.055  0.028 * 
Expects US economy to do better  -0.005  0.029    0.012  0.012    -0.003  0.027  
Expects US economy to do worse  0.019 0.030     0.003 0.012    -0.017 0.028  
Expects US interest rates to go higher  0.046 0.023 *  -0.006  0.009    -0.045  0.025 * 
Expects US interest rates to go lower  0.023  0.046    -0.014  0.015    -0.008  0.046  
Expects future income to rise faster 
than prices  0.002  0.026    -0.004  0.010    0.006  0.027  
Expects future income to rise lower 
than prices  0.015  0.029    -0.005  0.011    -0.010  0.028  
Investment horizon > 10 yrs  0.064 0.026 **    0.006 0.010    -0.066 0.028 ** 
Willingness to take above average 
financial risk  0.114 0.026 ***  -0.025  0.009 ***  -0.080  0.023 ***
Non-investment income  0.003  0.005    -0.001  0.001    -0.002  0.004  
Net real wealth  0.031 0.007 ***   0.001 0.002    -0.029 0.006 ***
Net financial wealth  0.006 0.003 **    0.004 0.003    -0.009 0.002 ***
Intention to leave a bequest  0.115 0.025 ***   0.016 0.013    -0.120 0.027 ***
Has received inheritance  0.080 0.025 ***  -0.018  0.008 **   -0.059  0.026 ** 
Credit constrained  -0.048  0.048    0.002  0.026    0.041  0.040  
Last year's income unexpectedly low  0.014 0.031     0.011 0.015    -0.020 0.029  
Works/ed  in the Financial Sector  0.001 0.023     0.000 0.009     0.005 0.024  
Year 1998  0.010 0.030    -0.044 0.016 ***   0.026 0.034  
Year 2001  -0.077 0.031 **    -0.056 0.018 ***   0.129 0.033 ***
Year 2004  -0.060  0.034 *  -0.058  0.018 ***  0.112 0.036 ***
                               
Notes: Median semi-elasticities are shown for net investment income, and net financial and net real wealth, average 
marginal effects for the remaining covariates. Estimates and standard errors account for multiple imputation in the SCF, 
using the results in Rubin (1987). ***,**,* denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% respectively. 52
Figure 1. Graphical Representation of the Model 
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Endnotes
                                                
1 Baele et al., 2007, while noting that the extent of the home bias has been decreasing due to globalization and 
regional integration, still find a large home bias in several countries. 
2 Several explanations have been proposed for this phenomenon, including trading costs (Tesar and Werner, 1995, 
Amadi and Bergin, 2006), informational costs and asymmetries (Ahearne et al., 2004, Choe et al., 2005, Dvorak, 
2005), poor investment protection and corporate governance (La Porta et al., 1999,  Dahlquist et al., 2003, Leuz et 
al., 2005, Stulz, 2005), transparency in international markets (Gelon and Wei, 2005), real exchange rate volatility 
(Fidora et al., 2007) and behavioral biases (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000, Strong and Xu, 2003). In addition, lack of 
international diversification has been recently linked to investors’ poor understanding about financial information 
and opportunities available to them (Graham et al., 2005). 
3 Most of the empirical literature on household portfolios is based on univariate models for a given asset without 
taking into account possible spillover effects to the other assets. Exceptions are provided by Perraudin and Sorensen 
(2000) who simultaneously model demands for money accounts, stocks and bonds, Alessie et al. (2004) who 
simultaneously study stocks and mutual funds, and Christelis et al. (2009) who study investments across different 
stockholding modes.  
4 For studies using macro data see Burger and Warnock, 2006, Fidora et al., 2007. For studies that utilize 
information form institutional investors see Dahlquist et al., 2003, Strong and Xu, 2003, Ahearne et al., 2004, Leuz 
et al., 2005, Ammer et al., 2006) 
5 Questions on foreign asset investments are asked for the first time in 1992, but information on some of the 
covariates we use in our estimation is only available since 1995. 
6 Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) document widespread inactivity of households as regards changes to the share of 
stocks in either their retirement accumulation or in their flow contributions in retirement accounts over a ten-year 
period. On the other hand, Barber and Odean (2000) report that households who directly own stocks through a 
brokerage account tend to engage in excessive stock trading. 
7 See Greene (1998) for a similar argument in the context of credit scoring models. 
8 Households who run their own business are asked about its type (e.g. partnership, a sole proprietorship, etc.) and 
one item in the list of possible answers is foreign business. However, only a trivially small number of business 
holders declares ownership of this type of business. 
9 None of the cross correlations among the dummies of being a college graduate, doing a great deal of shopping 
around, and working in the financial industry exceed .09 in the data, which implies that each of these three factors 
can play a quite distinct role as factors that influence investment choices. 
10 We take advantage of the fact that the SCF asks explicitly whether a household gets advice from friends or uses 
the Internet to obtain financial information, allowing for a direct assessment of their contribution on stockholding. 
11 We control for income, net real and net financial wealth, which all have skewed distributions, by using the inverse 
hyperbolic sine transformation: log(x+(x
2+1)
1/2), which allows for non linear effects and is defined for zero and 
negative values. Net financial wealth enters in each equation after deducting the amount of the asset in question in 
order to avoid endogeneity problems. 
12 French and Poterba (1991), Bohn and Tesar (1996), and Kilka and Weber (2000) argue that expectations about 
high returns in a particular market make investors to increase the share of their portfolios invested in stocks from 
that market. 
13 Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981) were the first to estimate a probit model adjusted for selectivity. More recently, 
Jenkins et al. (2006) have used a bivariate probit model with two selection equations to study consent to give 
information during a survey interview. 
14 We use 150 Halton draws and the Stata function mvnp to implement the GHK simulator, as described in 
Cappellari and Jenkins (2006).   
15 For example, in our model, the equation for any stock ownership can be separately identified from the equation 
for foreign stock investment by using the subsample of those who do not own any stocks, while the equation for 
foreign accounts can be separately identified from the equation for foreign bonds by using the subsample of those 
who have any accounts but do not own any bonds. 
16 Households are asked if they save for “a rainy day”. 
17 The discrepancy between coefficients and marginal affects can also occur in other multi-equation discrete choice 
models in which choices are inter-related (e.g. in multinomial logit/probit). 
18 Coefficient estimates from the three two-stage probit models are available upon request. 55
                                                                                                                               
19 In the simpler alternative estimation of three two-stage probits only the selection term in stocks is significant, and 
is even stronger than in the multivariate model (equal to 0.97). 
20 Replacing this summation with the sum of the three unconditional probabilities of owning foreign stocks, foreign 
bonds and foreign accounts would involve double counting of several asset combinations. In our calculations we 
always use the sum of probabilities of the relevant asset combinations in order to calculate probabilities of asset 
choices. 
21 For dummy variables the marginal effect is defined as the weighted mean difference across households in the 
predicted probability when the regressor is equal to one and when the regressor is equal to zero. For income- and 
wealth-related continuous variables we calculate median semi-elasticities instead of average ones because 
computation of semi-elasticities requires multiplication of the marginal effect with the level of the financial 
variables, which have distributions with a large positive skew. 
22 The good predictive performance of the multivariate probit is all the more notable given that maximization of its 
likelihood function does not lead to any automatic equality of actual proportions with average predicted 
probabilities, as is the case with a simple probit. 
23 In order to compute probabilities of choices spanning two or more of the three saving vehicles that are generated 
by the three independent two-stage probits, we proceed as follows: i) any probability of a choice in a given saving 
vehicle conditional on a choice in another is computed as equal to the unconditional (marginal) probability; ii) any 
joint probability of choices across different asset vehicles is computed as the product of the respective marginal 
probabilities. 
24 In those models, higher future income, although uncertain, implies a minimum guaranteed value of income at each 
future period that can serve as a surrogate riskless asset discounted by households, thus encouraging investment in 
stocks today. 
25 The SCF does not provide information on immigrant status but, to the extent that the immigrants are 
overrepresented in the group of non-whites, it may be the case that they opt for investments in foreign stocks of their 
country of origin, given the lower information costs that this option would involve. More information on immigrant 
status is needed, however, in order to investigate this conjecture. 
26 We can not estimate the effect of bad health on foreign bonds because bad health perfectly predicts no foreign 
bond ownership. 
27 The conditional probability of owning foreign stocks conditional on owning any foreign asset is given in equation 
(15) above and the corresponding probabilities for foreign bonds and foreign accounts are computed in an analogous 
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